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Department of Engineering Management
Abstroa- Due to electrical power restructuring, a dramatic
change has been made to the generation and transmission sectors
of the power industry. Rules and legislation are continuously
changing. To promote more competition, transmission has to be
expanded or npgraded to remove congestion and market power.
Tbe cost allocation of new investment in transmission has to be
recalculated. The sorialization methods of tbe past have been
shown to be unfair to some market and network participants. The
decentralization of cost allocation must be considered. The
proposed paper provides a comparison between traditional cost
allocation methods and a new cost allocation method based on
agent-based game theory. A multi-generatorlbus system will be
used to compare the cost aUocation methods.

Socialization of costs harms customers who do not benefit.
New projects providing economic benefits must recover some
cost from those who receive the benefits. The use of a benefitdriven methodology, however, has some drawbacks. It may
possibly slow investment and decrease reliability.

The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
stated “The gap between the transmission expansion need and
the proposed construction of transmission is widening. To
support the reliability of the bulk power system, proper
incentives must he developed to encourage transmission
construction” [24]. The statistical data shows that plans for
additional transmission lines decreased from 1994 to 1999. but
Game theory, multi-agent, transmission started to increase from 1999 to the present [24].

Index Ternis investment, power system deregulation

I. INTRODUCnON
ransmission plays a crucial role in electricity markets
.
since transmission links all generators and loads together.
Transmission is the electricity super highway and
responsible for increases in competition in the generator sector
and interruption in the growth of load sector. This approach is
based on the idea that both the consumer and the generation
sector will benefit from the cost reduction and increases in
sales. Therefore, the consumer and generation sectors should
share the cost of any new line investment. The costs of the
new line must be less than the costs of the benefits (congestion
saving cost). Future growth of the load must also be
considered.

T.

”

The Deparhnent of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have recently indicated
support for the principle of cost allocation, stating that the
costs of the transmission upgrade or expansion should he
defined by customers who need or benefit from the upgrade or
expansion. Before deregulation of the power industry, all
transmission projects costs were shared by participants in the
load sector. The change of cost allocation structure requires
the abandonment of the old cost allocation methods within the
new market structure. The new paradigm for cost allocation
suggests that parties who have the need and/or benefit from
the new transmission investment should pay the costs. The
new investment should not be socialized across all customers.

Congestion cost is often the primary indicator for utilities in
deciding whether to build a new transmission line. The new
line will relieve constraints and gain access to lower cost
generation between each end of the line. The cost of the new
line will not be socialized to all users. A new line with
multiple beneficiaries might negotiate joint support among
users who will get benefit from the line [3, 71.
In a decentralized market, all users realize that if there is no
expansion of the new line to relieve the current congestion, the
price of electricity will rise. Therefore, the increase in price
results in a monopoly of the transmission business. The
monopoly allows transmission companies to earn additional
revenue, decreasing their financial interests for expanding the
network. Since some transmission has recently been
deregulated, the methods used in this paper will assume that
customers and generators are allowed to build a new
transmission line to relieve congestion and gain access to
lower-priced electricity [I, 251.
11. NETWORK EXPANSION
An illustrated example of the limits of transmission lines and
power generation is provided in Figure 1 and described later in
section V. There are several techniques that can be used to
rsnk possible locations for adding new lines to an existing
system. A heuristic approach suggested hy [9, 131 is used to
identify if a solution is feasible under the domain of a
quadratic linear programming problem. The formula is
expressed as:

I The authors are with L e Univenit). ofMssowi-Rolla,Falla, MO 65409.
Email: jak?.pun@umr.edu; enke@”.dq bchow@ce.umr.edu.
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Cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory that
relates to games in which there are three or more players who
are free to negotiate binding and enforceable agreements ahout
Subject to
the formation of coalitions and the divisions of the payoffs that
BO+K'P, = P
(2) result form their coordinated actions [lo, 11, 121. The payoff
result is used to determine the percentage cost allocation of a
IB,,AOI 5
(3) new line to agent i. A cost allocation cooperative game is
given hy (NA, C), where NA is the set of the N agents and C
is the cost function. N agents group in m mutually exclusive
where c, is the cost of adding a line j to the network, PD is the and excluding coa~itions. The value represents the
flow vector for the possible line, M is the number of possible configurations,
that:
new lines, p, is the active power (in P.u.) flowing through the
added line j,i.e., the jIh element of PD,B is the matrix whose
6 = {S,,SZ, ...,S,"}
(4)
elements are the imaginary parts of the nodal admittance
where 6 is a partition of NA fulfilling two conditions
matrix of the existing network, 0 is the phase angle vector, K'
S, f @; j =1,2,..,m
is the transpose of the nodal phase connection matrix, P is the
s, n s, = Q
nodal injection power for the overall network, BL is a diagonal
where 0 is the empty set
matrix whose elements are branch admittance. P , is the branch

(I)

<

The concept of economic use of the transmission network may
he divided into two groups [ lY]:
I j Canacity usaee. The argument is that lines arc
dimensioned for peaking conditions, $0 that capacit) usage
must he the guide to allocate payment among users.
2) Enero uswe. The argument is that lines are
dimensioned within a network that must respond to a luad
curve. 'Therefore, it is the energy usage by agents that must
he the guide to dlocate payments among users.

' 1 3Shaples
~
value(sv, has heen used solve
t)pes
uiproblems (2, 12, 221. 'lbc SV calculates a \,slue hacd on an
indkidual's contributions among all members in a coalition. It
is a u,neept from the n.person coTornte game. sv is
weighted a\ eragc of marginal contrihutions of a member to all
the pussihle contribution coalitions that a member participates.
11 is asumed
a
coalition is formed. The formula for
the Shapley Value is gib en h) :

~, =

111. MULlI-AGENT AND GAME ITII~OKY
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€3) definition, an agent is an entir) that makes decisions
according to h i s k r o\\n interests, as well ac the actions of
is 11 here I is ;I' ptqer, s is a coalitinn of players, s IS a number
other
A system \r.ith man)
,..llej a multi-agent
ssstem 15, 6 , 15, 221, in a po\r.er of players in coalition S,n is the tow1 number of pla)ers. .? is
is the char3cterisric function
nehvork, sc\,eml entities c;lnhe representej
by the set of all players. and
agents, such a genenton, loads, and transmission line
coalitiun S .
onners, each making a decision about the expansion of thr
nenr.ork, ~ ) ~ i ~ it ~ is l difilcul1
l ~ ,
determine \\hich
In order to reduce the compleairy o i the Shapley valur,
arc guing
pas for the ne,, tranSmiSsjon
line
Ketchpel introJuced the Bilatcral Shaplcy Value (RSVj 1231.
'lhus, n e propose a m u l t i - a p t approach to cost allocation of
Let S'( _c PI .I/ he a coalition wwturc on a given set of agunts
a new in\.eStment that aes
intu
the benetits of
player in the s)stem from the addition ofthe new line.
A = ( a! , . . . , o m\\here
}:
C',
C, c A is a (hilatcral) coalition of
Jisjoint (n-agent) cu3l1tions C and C, (n ? 0). The Rilatrral
Shaple) Value for some coalition C, in a hilatcral wdition C
individuallyin cooper.lion
Each player or agent
other agents to iorm a coalition. I t is assumed that all agents is &fined a:
act rationally [12]. This mcms the) prefer to reduce their
electricir) price in the case of loads, or cam more money in
RSV,,<-,.-,,
,. ,(C,)
C . ) ~ O.. j.( i .~ ( C ) - I~ ( C ' .()6) )
. , , = 0 . 5 1.( ..
case of-generators [SI. There are no restrictions to form
Both coalitions C, and C, are called founders of C, and ifc)
coalitions among the agents. The agents create coalitions that
denotes the self-value of coalition C.
minimize their cost participation for a new transmission line.
The joint cost is lower than the s u m of individual costs 151.

,
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~
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The process to form a coalition among agents is based on the When congestion occurs, least-cost generation must oiien be
passed over for purposes of system security. The system
approach of [18].
operator acts as a clearing agent and manager of system
A. Self Value Calculation: Each generator or load is security. The difference between LMP at two nodes is the cost
represented by one agent. Each agent uses all available of transmission between the two nodes [19].
information to calculate its initial self-value. This value is
calculated by the maximum value that the agent can get The LMP method is the dollar per MWh cost of supplying the
from the new line. If the agent doesn't want to invest in the next incremental load to a specific location in the transmission
grid. It is the basis for calculating the amount for which power
new line, this value will be zero.
producers will get paid and tbe amount that customers are
B. Communication and Securitv Check All agents send charged for their loads. It is also a very important indicator of
their self-value and the coalitions to independent market conditions. For example, areas that have numerous
coordinators (ISO, RTO). The IS0 or RTO will check the amounts of inexpensive generation, but with few loads, will
security of the coalitions and publish to all agents and each have lower energy prices than the locations that have high-cost
coalition After founder agents receive a message back of generation and high load. Due to congestion, the loads on
from the coordinator, each agent proceeds to calculate a the congested locations will have higher prices than those in
new payoff to rank the order, form coalition with other less congested areas. If there is no congestion, the LMP is the
agents, and find the optimal benefit for each agent in the same at all nodes. Therefore, each LMP is equal to the Market
network.
Clearing Price (MCP), since none of the transmission
constraints is binding [14].
C. Rank Pavoff for Each Aaent: After receiving messages
from the RTO, each agent proceeds to rank the order to
V. ILLUSTRATION
form a
with Other agents. The assumption was From our previous work on load forecasting, loa& have
made that the transmission line life is 10 years. The interest seasonal and time effects. The Monte
simulation is used
rate is fixed.
to generate the future load demand for the next 10 years of our
5-bus system, as s h o w in Figure 1. The demand growth is
D. Negotiation: Every agent begins to negotiate with other
to be a 2% incremental increase every two
The
agents to get the optimum benefit for each agent.
iudee
Net Present Value (NPV)
.
. .1201
. is used to .
_the new
transmission investment project. The interest rate is assumed
Iv. APPLrCAT1oN l"TRANsMlssloN PLANNING
constant at 5% a year. There is no new generator into the
The multi-agent system based on cooperative game theory is market during this period. The benefit is judged based on cost
used to form a coalition. The Locational Marginal Price savings from an LMP basis.
(LMP) method [17] is utilized to judge the benefit of each
player. The assumption used in the LMP method is that the
overall benefit of each player must be increased after the new
line is added to the network. If the overall benefit decreases,
the new line will be rejected.
~~

fl;

By using the LMP method with the system that socializes all
customers in the system, the postage stamp method 141 does
not produce
efficient
signals.
reason
is because
the
cost. price
In contrast,
theThe
LMP
method
has proven
pay
for the line
customers who do not benefit from the new line must often

Nodl
Gene".

to provide efficient price signals. The LMP method 1171 is
essential in achieving market efficiency when the price is the
most efficient signal.
Determining the LMP is done most efficiently through a
voluntary, bid-based market. Loads submit bids to the system
operator to purchase power at a particular node for a
maximum acceptable purchase price - that is, they inform the
market what they are willing to pay for electricity as
transmitted. Generators, on the other hand, submit to the
system operator offers to sell electricity - at the sale price at
the point of injection into the grid, but prior to transmission.
The system operator then purchases and dispatches the
generation in the order of offered price, lowest to highest,
based on the selling price at the nodes on the bid and offer
prices received.

3

Load I

4

hadl

Figure 1: Five-bus testing system (before adding the new
invesment)
The system consists of four loads and four generators. The
generator details are shown in Table 1. The average price of
each generator is different to make it more competitive in the
current market design. The model assumes that no changes in
the system, generation, and transmission over the planning
period. All transmission lines have reactance 0.1, resistance
0.01 and rating at 800.
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Table I: Detail of generators

0

Monte Carlo simulation is used to create the demand curve on
an hourly basis. This demand curve has seasonal and time of
use effects to make it more realistic. We use this data to
calculate the average hourly load each year. Again, the growth

Load 3

hodr

LO&

data isused to calculate the L b at each node.

I

[

I

Load1

Load3

I

Load4

I

LOA5

Year0

I

960.8462

1

952.8296

I

564.1727

I

571.028

YcarI

I

980.0632

I

971.8862

I

575.4561

I

582.4485

Year10

1

1060.852

1

1052.001

1

622.8922

1

630.461

I 18.25 I

~~~~~

..rearu

"

Year1

I

I5

I

35

Node4
A1 19

41.55

20

I 21.91 I 21.29

I

From the NPV analysis, the overall cost saving of the system
will he 490M for the next 10 year. This meani if the &st of
new investment is less than 490M, this line should he build.
Customers will save future electricitv cost. The next sten is to
use the Shapley Value to allocate the cost of this investment
and then compare it to the social cost and marginal loads.

~

I Nodel I Node2 I Node3 I
II 15
.~ I
__14 I 5 5 K S I
15
I
35
1 56.26 I
I

I

Table 4: LMF' (avg) at each node after that new line is build

Tahle 2: Load demand dnbil
~~~~~~~~~~~~

19.11

I Nodes
I __ .- .
I 30.05

I 56.26 I 41.55 I

79114

30~05

The LMP calculator program from PA consultant is used to
find the LMP at each node. The benefit of each agent is
calculated h m cost saving before and after the new
investment takes place. This criterion is used to form a
coalition as shown in Tahle 5 . For example, coalition 1
represents that only load 1 invests in the new transmission.
The coalition (1,3,4) represents that load 1, load 3 and load 4
are to invest in the new transmission.
Table 3: LMF' (avg) at each node before the new line is build

~~

Coalition

Figure 2 illustrates the system after a new investment takes
place. The new investment is the transmission line between
node 1 and node 3. This line will remove some congestion and
increase system reliability. After the line is complete, each
node LMP will be changed. The benefit of the new investment
is calculated from the cost savings of each node fiom the
change in LMP. LMP is based on hourly basis and converted
to a yearly expense. The Net Present Value method with an
interest of 5% is used to calculate benefit value of each load.

1

3

1
~

Bendit

Coalition

Benefit

0

34
35
45

$471,071,712.10
$406,383,618.08
$I64,321,473.44
$439,666,232.38

-$31,405,479.72
$356,566,928.37

$132,915,993.72
345

Table 5 : Benefit of each coalition
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$520,888,401.SI
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3
4
Method
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23.47%
Social Welfare
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25%
25%
Load
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18.54%
I Proportional I
I
I
Table 6:Cost allocation result of each method

5
10.2%
25%
18.74%

I

VI. CONCLUSIONS

nemulti-agent

system has a
to help decision
form a coalition between agents, such as load and generation
entities. The coalition facilitates the cost allocation of each
agent for upgrade or transmission line expansion in the new
environment of power deregulation. Competition in the new
environment forces all participants in the network to produce
additional profit andlor reduce their costs. The system will
significantly improve the method for finding the best solution
in cost preparation of the new line to those agents who will
benefit the most. me coalition will he formed based on the
benefits gained by each agent. From the results, the game
theory based method is better in the sense of fairness. The
agents that will not get benefit from the new investment have
been treated fairly. me agents who
benefit from this
investment have to pay more. Future work will develop the
price model that deals with uncertain in supply and demand to
make the cost allocation model more realistic.
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VIII. APPENDIX
The Social weljare nrethod is a method that forced every load
in the network to share all cost of the new investment h t h e
network. It can be written as

N is number of player
C, is a cost allocation of player i
Loadproportional nrerhod
Letting 6,he the amount of load for player i, we can then
write

c,=-

0,

f:e,
j=l

C, is a cost allocation of player i
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